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Reproductive Dreams and Nightmares:  
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Genetic Testing 
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Recent technological developments surrounding genetic testing pose new 
challenges to well-established reproductive practices. One current example 
is the fertility industry’s struggle to maintain gamete donor anonymity 
against the growing use of direct-to-consumer DNA tests. Consider the 
widely covered story of Danielle Teuscher, who in 2019 accidentally 
discovered the identity of her daughter’s anonymous sperm donor after using 
a 23andMe DNA test. Danielle’s attempt to reach out to the newfound family 
member was followed by a cease and desist letter from the sperm bank for 
violating their agreement. In addition, the sperm bank refused to give 
Danielle the four vials of sperm from the same donor, which she had reserved 
for future use, thus thwarting her reproductive plans to have genetic siblings 
for her daughter. 
The Teuscher case introduces a type of reproductive dispute that United 
States courts have not yet resolved. This Article considers several of the new 
legal questions produced by this set of novel circumstances, about the legal 
framework through which the dispute should be adjudicated, the nature of 
the rights at stake, and the harms imposed by forced or confounded 
procreation. It argues that in the social context of anonymous sperm 
donation, the contractual approach is a more appropriate—if insufficient—
legal prism through which a dispute over the use of donated sperm should 
be resolved. The context of sperm donation also demands a nuanced 
treatment of the rights at stake—one that distinguishes, for example, between 
the right not to be a genetic parent and the right not to be a parent in the 
legal sense. Furthermore, properly articulating the interests of the parties 
requires a reassessment of the harm that forced procreation will impose on 
a person who at least at some point in time agreed to father a child they 
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would not know or care for, as well as the harm imposed on a person denied 
a child carrying a particular genetic constituency. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Danielle Teuscher, a thirty-year-old nanny from Portland, Oregon, 
took a 23andMe DNA test that she bought as a Christmas gift for her 
family and friends.1 Her five-year-old daughter, Zoe, had been conceived 
through the use of an anonymous sperm donation from Northwest 
Cryobank in Spokane, Washington.2 Danielle decided to get another 
23andMe test for Zoe in order to learn about her ancestry and medical 
background.3 This commonly used consumer DNA test, however, 
 
1. Jacqueline Mroz, A Mother Learns the Identity of Her Child’s Grandmother. A Sperm Bank 
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revealed more than Danielle ever hoped it would: The test results 
identified the mother of the donor—that is, Zoe’s grandmother. “Excited 
and curious” about these findings, Danielle reached out to the newly 
found family member, saying that she would be open for contact with 
either her or her son.4 The grandmother responded: “I don’t understand.”5 
This laconic response was followed by a cease-and-desist letter from the 
sperm bank, threatening Danielle with penalties of $20,000 for violating 
the agreement she had signed with the bank by trying to contact the donor 
or seek his identity.6 The letter further stated that if she continued this 
“course of action,” the bank would seek a restraining order or injunction.7 
Danielle was devastated. 
This widely covered story brought to the fore an ongoing legal and 
ethical debate over gamete donation,8 and the challenges direct-to-
consumer DNA tests pose to the fertility industry’s efforts to secure donor 
anonymity.9 In the US, despite calls to revise and regulate gamete 
donation, this aspect of the reproductive market remains largely 
unregulated, leaving unanswered many questions that technological 
developments give rise to.10 In Teuscher’s case, for example, legal 
experts questioned whether Zoe could be constrained by a contract that 
her mother had signed before she was even born, and whether a provision 
limiting a child’s ability to find her genetic origins could be enforced.11 
But Danielle’s pursuit of her daughter’s genetic origins had another 
grave consequence for her reproductive life: She was denied access to 
four vials of sperm from the same donor, which she had reserved for 
future use.12 In response to her plea, the sperm bank agreed to refund the 
 
4. Id. 
5. Woman Uses DNA Test, Finds Sperm Donor—and Pays a “Devastating” Price, CBS NEWS 
(Jan. 31, 2019), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/woman-finds-sperm-donor-after-using-dna-test-
raising-questions-about-donor-anonymity/ [https://perma.cc/N28L-N9BA]; see also Mroz, supra 
note 1 (offering yet another account of Teuscher’s story). 
6. Mroz, supra note 1. 
7. Id. 
8. See, e.g., id.; CBS NEWS, supra note 5; Jacqueline Mroz, DNA Testing Opens a Window into 
Sperm Banks, HERALD-TRIB. (Feb. 26, 2019), https://www.heraldtribune.com/entertainmentlife/ 
20190226/dna-testing-opens-window-into-sperm-banks [https://perma.cc/5UV8-PUTU]; Natalie 
Rahhal, Sperm Bank PUNISHES Mother for Accidentally Finding Her Donor Through 23AndMe, 
DAILY MAIL (Jan. 31, 2019), https://www.dailymail.co.uk/health/article-6653943/sperm-bank-
punishes-mother-accidentally-finding-donor-23andme.html [https://perma.cc/KF7E-VKB5]. 
9. Susan Dominus, Sperm Donors Can’t Stay Secret Anymore. Here’s What That Means, N.Y. 
TIMES MAG. (June 26, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/26/magazine/sperm-donor-
questions.html [https://perma.cc/DM29-V8C6]. 
10. See generally Maya Sabatello, Regulating Gamete Donation in the U.S.: Ethical, Legal and 
Social Implications, 4 LAWS 352, 353–57 (2015). 
11. Mroz, supra note 1. 
12. CBS NEWS, supra note 5. 
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amount she paid for the vials, but stood by its refusal to return the vials 
to her—a decision Danielle decided to fight.13 
This case introduces a set of circumstances that US courts have yet to 
encounter. While reproductive disputes have become prevalent over the 
years along with the growing use of assisted reproductive technologies 
(ARTs), none of the publicly available cases involve a conflict between 
an anonymous gamete donor, a recipient, and a reproductive services 
provider.14 Teuscher’s case thus raises a set of new legal and ethical 
questions lying at the intersection of family law, constitutional law, and 
contracts, which are the focus of this article. 
The first question regards the legal framework that should be applied 
to such a case. At least two frameworks have been applied in reproductive 
disputes involving ARTs: a contractual approach, where decisions are 
based on the agreements that the donor and recipient entered into with the 
sperm bank and/or with one another; and a balancing-of-interests test, 
where the rights and interests of the parties are weighed against one 
another. Developed in the context of pre-embryo disposition disputes, 
arguments in favor of and against each framework assume a familial 
relationship between the parties. This Article shows that, because of this 
difference, the balancing-of-interests approach will be of limited value in 
the social context of anonymous sperm donation and that the contractual 
approach is a more appropriate—if insufficient—legal prism through 
which disputes should be resolved. 
A second interrelated question raised by this case regards the nature of 
the rights at stake. The prevailing framework would place the recipient’s 
right to be a parent against the donor’s right not to be a parent. Yet the 
context of sperm donation demands a more nuanced treatment—one that 
goes beyond a “monolithic” concept of the right not to be a parent.15 For 
example, it is important to make a distinction between the right not to be 
 
13. Mroz, supra note 1. In June, Teuscher first filed suit against the sperm bank in a federal 
court in the Eastern District of Washington for injunctive relief and damages in the amount of 
$100,000. For the most recent version of her complaint, see Second Amended Complaint, Teuscher 
v. CCB-NWB, LLC, 19-cv-00204 (E.D. Wash. Nov. 12, 2019), available at 
https://www.donorsiblingregistry.com/sites/default/files/files/AmendedComplaint_11_13_19.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/YLB9-WYHZ]. Danielle recently started a GoFundMe campaign to help her 
cover the cost of her legal battle against the bank. Danielle Teuscher, Help Danielle and Zoe Fight 
NW Cryobank, GOFUNDME (Jan. 8, 2020), https://www.gofundme.com/f/9f8nm5-tbd 
[https://perma.cc/VY6K-YZYN]. 
14. Though it is unclear whether the donor in this case explicitly withdrew his consent to any 
further use of his sperm vials, or otherwise contributed to the sperm bank’s reaching its decision to 
deny Danielle access to the sperm, the analysis proposed in this Article assumes that the once-
anonymous donor objects to its use. 
15. See generally I. Glenn Cohen, The Right Not to Be a Genetic Parent?, 81 S. CAL. L. REV. 
1115 (2008) [hereinafter Cohen, Genetic Parent]. 
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a genetic parent and the right not to be a parent in the social or legal sense, 
because these different rights may warrant different levels of protection. 
The third question relates to the harms that ruling either in favor of or 
against each party will entail. This part of the analysis tends to focus on 
the life circumstances of both parties in evaluating the types of harms that 
unwanted or deprived procreation may impose on them. There is some 
consistency in the way these financial, physical, and psychological harms 
have been conceptualized over the years. However, the case of an 
anonymous sperm donor requires a reassessment of, for example, the 
harm that forced procreation will impose on a person who at least at some 
point in time agreed to father a child he would not know or care for; as 
well as the harm imposed on a person denied a child carrying some 
particular genetic constituency that the recipient has dreamed of and 
hoped for. 
In engaging such questions, this Article draws on cases involving pre-
embryo disposition disputes between couples, the most common type of 
reproductive disputes to have reached American courts thus far. It also 
draws on a case that came before the Israeli Supreme Court in 2013, Doe 
v. Ministry of Health,16 in which the underlying facts were akin to those 
Teuscher faced. In Doe, the Court had to decide between a sperm donor 
who had a change of heart about his prior decision to grant use of his 
sperm, and Doe, a woman who had already used the donor’s sperm to 
conceive her first child and wished to use the same donor’s sperm for her 
second child. 
The analysis proposed in this Article highlights the unique 
characteristics of cases involving an anonymous gamete donation 
compared to other reproductive disputes courts have encountered thus far. 
It also considers how the emergence of new reproductive practices, such 
as at-home DNA tests, may challenge long-standing practices and the 
ideologies underlying them about the family and familial relations. It may 
thus inform courts’ future decisions by pointing to some of the pitfalls of 
applying the legal tools they currently have at their disposal to resolve 
these types of disputes. 
The Article begins in Part I with the legal and normative background 
of the practice of sperm donation in the United States, where it is largely 
unregulated, yet prevalent and relatively uncontroversial. Part II 
describes the Doe decision’s factual basis and provides an overview of 
the Israeli Supreme Court’s analysis. It also describes the regulation of 
 
16. See generally HCJ 4077/12 Doe v. Ministry of Health (Feb. 5, 2013), Nevo Legal Database 
(by subscription, in Hebrew) (Isr.) [hereinafter The Doe Case], available at 
http://versa.cardozo.yu.edu/sites/default/files/upload/opinions/Doe%20v.%20Ministry%20of%20
Health.pdf [https://perma.cc/C3G5-GMCT]. 
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sperm donation in Israel, where it is controlled by a relatively 
comprehensive apparatus, thus providing necessary context to the 
decision in Doe. Part III outlines the two principal frameworks that US 
courts have employed for the resolution of pre-embryo disputes over the 
past two and a half decades. Part IV discusses the nature of the right to 
procreate and the right not to procreate, first in general, then in the case 
of disputes over anonymous sperm donation. Part V considers the harms 
that a ruling in favor of or against the recipient and the donor may impose, 
and compares these harms to those commonly evaluated by courts in 
reproductive disputes. Part VI discusses the principal arguments against 
the contractual approach, and considers to what extent these arguments 
apply in the context of anonymous sperm donation. It then applies the 
contractual framework to Teuscher’s case. This part ends with a brief 
discussion of possible steps reproductive service providers may take to 
ease the task of enforcing sperm donation agreements. 
I.  THE CURRENT LEGAL LANDSCAPE 
Different regulations address several different aspects of sperm 
donation as a reproductive practice. First, they may address the act of 
donation itself, including restrictions on the eligibility criteria for 
becoming a sperm donor, what monetary compensation it may entail, and 
guidelines for record keeping of donor information. Second, they may 
address the rights of gamete donors in relation to any resulting children. 
Third, they may address the rights of donor-conceived children—both in 
relation to the donor, and in relation to their half-siblings (i.e. children 
born from a mutual gamete donor). These different aspects of the practice 
may be governed by several areas of law that “converge in the donor 
world,”17 including family law, constitutional law, privacy law, health 
law, and contract law. 
A.  Regulating Donation 
Gamete donation is “an outright, and undoubtedly thriving, 
commercial activity” generating “billions of dollars per year,”18 but, like 
many other reproductive practices in the United States, it is largely 
unregulated.19 In the United States Food and Drug Administration’s 
(FDA) eligibility requirements for donors, the regulatory threshold for 
gamete donation is low,20 requiring a review of the donor’s medical 
 
17. NAOMI CAHN, THE NEW KINSHIP: CONSTRUCTING DONOR-CONCEIVED FAMILIES 91 
(2013) [hereinafter CAHN, THE NEW KINSHIP]. 
18. Sabatello, supra note 10, at 354. 
19. Id. at 353. 
20. Id. 
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records, and imposing “screening of donated gametes for predominantly 
communicable and infectious diseases (e.g., HIV, Hepatitis C), including 
six months quarantine and retesting before use of anonymous 
donations.”21 There is no “centralized system” that documents gamete 
donations or the children born from specific sperm; donors may thus 
donate several times, even in multiple locations.22 “The regulation of 
private fertility clinics and gamete banks by individual states is also often 
lacking, and among those that have crafted regulations—there is great 
variation as to the collection, preservation, and release of donors’ 
information.”23 
Over the years many scholars have raised concerns over the risks this 
lack of regulatory oversight poses to the health and safety of donors and 
of donor-conceived children.24 This includes the risk of incest, as these 
children will have no way of knowing whether half-siblings exist, much 
less have any way to identify them.25 Such criticism is often followed by 
recommendations for improving the standard of genetic testing 
performed on donors,26 creating a central registry of children born 
through sperm donation, and limiting the number of children born 
through an individual donor’s gametes.27 Other calls for further 
regulation are grounded in the rights of donor-conceived children, and 
the “welfare-related” harms that may occur when these children are 
denied information about their genetic origin.28 
In the absence of regulatory guidance, sperm banks, fertility clinics, 
and other institutions providing reproductive services may develop their 
own policies and guidelines for carrying out sperm donations.29 As 
illustrated by Teuscher’s case, agreements with such service providers 
attempt to regulate and control the ability of donors and recipients to 
exchange information. These institutions may also decide to limit a 
recipient’s access to sperm vials under certain circumstances or to allow 
sperm donors to withdraw consent to the future use of their gametes. 
 
21. Id. 
22. Id. at 354. 
23. Id. at 353. 
24. CAHN, THE NEW KINSHIP, supra note 17, at 151. 
25. See generally Naomi Cahn, Accidental Incest: Drawing the Line—Or the Curtain?—For 
Reproductive Technology, 32 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 59 (2009). 
26. Charles A. Sims et al., Genetic Testing of Sperm Donors: Survey of Current Practices, 94 
FERTILITY & STERILITY 126, 129 (2010). 
27. See CAHN, THE NEW KINSHIP, supra note 17, at 151–60 (discussing the promotion of donor 
health and safety); see generally Sabatello, supra note 10. 
28. Sabatello, supra note 10, at 357–58. 
29. See generally Katherine M. Johnson, Making Families: Organizational Boundary Work in 
U.S. Egg and Sperm Donation, 99 SOC. SCI. & MED. 64 (2013). 
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B.  Rights of Gamete Donors 
Similarly, no unified framework governs the rights of donors in 
relation to their prospective offspring. There is no federal legislation that 
determines parentage, but rather a set of “jumbled, incomplete” state laws 
that address different scenarios involving sperm donation.30 The most 
common scenario addressed in these state laws involve situations in 
which a married woman uses Artificial Insemination (AI) to become a 
parent, using either a known or unknown sperm donor.31 In this scenario, 
in order for her husband to become the child’s legal parent, “a doctor 
must supervise the insemination, the husband must consent in writing to 
the insemination, and the physician must file the husband’s consent with 
the state health department.”32 Only after these requirements have been 
satisfied will the donor’s legal rights in relation to the child be 
terminated.33 
The picture is more complicated in cases involving single women. The 
Uniform Parentage Act (UPA), originally silent about this scenario, now 
states more broadly that “[a] donor is not a parent of a child conceived by 
assisted reproduction.”34 While only a minority of states adopted the 
2017 UPA, it appears that most do terminate the parental rights of 
unknown sperm donors.35 When it comes to known sperm donors, 
however, states approach legal parentage in a variety of ways that reflect 
their attitudes as to whether biology, intent, marriage, and contract might 
constitute the appropriate source of family identity.36 The cases that arise 
under this type of regulation usually involve agreements that set out to 
determine the level of involvement, if any, the sperm donor will have in 
the child’s life. Whether these contracts are enforceable depends on “state 
laws concerning how artificial insemination must be performed and 
whether there is explicit statutory recognition of these contracts.”37 
C.  Rights of Donor-Conceived Children 
As one scholar noted in this particular context, “the U.S. legal system 
makes only little room for children’s rights.”38 Indeed, the “U.S. neither 
ratified the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child nor 
 
30. NAOMI R. CAHN, TEST TUBE FAMILIES: WHY THE FERTILITY MARKET NEEDS LEGAL 
REGULATION 88–89 (2009) [hereinafter CAHN, TEST TUBE FAMILIES]. 
31. Id. at 88–90. 
32. Id. at 90. 
33. Id. 
34. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 702 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2017). 
35. CAHN, TEST TUBE FAMILIES, supra note 30, at 87–90. 
36. Id. at 95. 
37. Id. at 92. 
38. Sabatello, supra note 10, at 357–58. 
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includes any mention of children as subjects of rights in its 
Constitution.”39 Parental prerogative, on the other hand, has been granted 
constitutional protection through a series of Supreme Court decisions 
recognizing parents’ right to the “care, custody and control” of their 
children.40 This characteristic of the legal system begins to explain the 
hold that donor anonymity continues to have in the American 
reproductive market, since “asserting a separate right on behalf of the 
minor child, such as the right to know a donor . . . [,] realistically requires 
the willingness to recognize tensions with established parental decision-
making rights.”41 This is also true for the right to contact a half-sibling, 
which is a relatively new development in the conceptualization of donor-
conceived children’s rights. Both rights underlie calls to regulate gamete 
donation in ways that recognize the relationships formed within what law 
professor Naomi Cahn refers to as “donor-conceived family 
communities” or “donor kin families or networks.”42 
These and other calls for additional regulatory oversight of sperm 
donation intensify as the use of at-home DNA tests and online sibling 
registries become more and more prevalent, allowing for the discovery of 
these genetic relations and the formation of new kinds of families.43 
These developments are undermining some long-held principles, such as 
donor anonymity,44 but also give rise to real, emotionally-laden conflicts 
between the parties involved in this practice, be it donors, recipients, 
donor-conceived children, or service providers. 
II.  DOE V. MINISTRY OF HEALTH 
A.  Background: The Israeli Legal Framework 
Unlike the United States, Israel’s reproductive practices and related 
services operate under greater oversight and control.45 Sperm donation in 
particular is regulated through public health regulations and circulars 
 
39. Id. at 358. 
40. CAHN, THE NEW KINSHIP, supra note 17, at 96–97. 
41. Id. at 97; Sabatello, supra note 10, at 357–58. 
42. CAHN, THE NEW KINSHIP, supra note 17, at 3. 
43. See, e.g., Ariana Eunjung Cha, 44 Siblings and Counting, WASH. POST (Sept. 12, 2018), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2018/health/44-donor-siblings-and-counting/?utm_ 
term=.17086994aa32 [https://perma.cc/XK5B-ZVVJ] (discussing the government’s attempts to 
regulate the growing number of donor-conceived births and the problems they impose). 
44. See, e.g., Guido Pennings, Genetic Databases and the Future of Donor Anonymity, 34 HUM. 
REPROD. 786, 786 (2019) (discussing how genetic databases increase the risk of donor anonymity 
and threaten the long-held principle of privacy in gamete donation). 
45. See, e.g., Daphna Birenbaum-Carmeli, Thirty-Five Years of Assisted Reproductive 
Technologies in Israel, 2 REPROD. BIOMEDICINE & SOC’Y ONLINE 16, 17 (2016) (outlining how, 
since 1982, the Israeli government has exercised great control over establishing reproductive 
technologies and guidelines). 
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issued by Israel’s Health Ministry Director-General,46 the last of which 
was circulated in 2007.47 These and other public health regulations set 
the general framework for the establishment of sperm banks and 
operation of artificial insemination and in vitro fertilization.48 
According to the regulations, sperm banks require the approval of the 
Health Ministry Director General; and such approval is given only to 
sperm banks operating in and as a part of hospitals.49 Artificial 
insemination may be performed only in such hospitals and only with 
sperm units received from that particular bank.50 
Eligible donors must be single men (not widowed or divorced), 
preferably between the ages of eighteen to thirty, who have not previously 
donated sperm.51 Donors are financially compensated directly by the 
sperm bank.52F52 Candidates must undergo genetic testing for several 
genetically transmitted diseases as part of the process of becoming sperm 
donors. 53F53 This process also entails several interviews in which the 
candidate is asked about his medical history, social background, and 
education.54F54 The donor then signs a “donor card,”55F55 which includes his 
physical examination test results and a description of his appearance; he 
also signs a personal statement and confidentiality agreement, stating that 
he consents to the use of his sperm and renounces access to any details 
about the recipient.56F56 These forms do not address the possibility of a 
 
46. People’s Health Regulations (Sperm Bank), 5739–1979, KT 3996 p. 1448 (Isr.) [hereinafter 
Sperm Bank Regulations]. The Circulars of the Director General of the Ministry of Health are 
issued thereunder. 
47. AVI ISRAELI, MINISTRY OF HEALTH, RULES REGARDING THE MANAGEMENT OF A SPERM 
BANK AND INSTRUCTIONS FOR PERFORMING ARTIFICIAL INSEMINATION (2007) [hereinafter 
CIRCULAR ON SPERM BANKS]. 
48. People’s Health Regulations (IVF), 5747–1987, KT 5035 p. 987 (Isr.) [hereinafter IVF 
Regulations]. Pursuant to these regulations, two circulars have been distributed setting the rules 
under which in vitro fertilization using the sperm from a non-anonymous sperm donor can be 
performed. 
49. Sperm Bank Regulations, supra note 46, at § 2. 
50. Id. 
51. Sperm Donation—Sperm Banks, MINISTRY HEALTH, https://www.health.gov.il/ 
English/Topics/fertility/Pages/sperm-bank.aspx [https://perma.cc/2F8W-EZ2N]. 
52. Id. These payments may vary, depending on the attractiveness of the donor in terms of, for 
example, education and physical characteristics. However, these generally range between $100–
$2000 per donation. 
53. Id. The donor must also agree “to let his DNA be retained for future tests, if these may be 
necessary.” Id. 
54. Id. 
55. CIRCULAR ON SPERM BANKS, supra note 47, at § 9(a). 
56. Id. at § 9(b). 
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donor withdrawing his consent. Sperm donors are barred from making 
any additional donations in another bank.57 
Eligible recipients are women, whether single or married, who want to 
become parents through an anonymous sperm donation.58 Each recipient 
must sign a “recipient card,” which includes details of her familial 
situation, any preference she and her spouse (if there is one) might have 
about the donor’s appearance,59 and a consent form for artificial 
insemination using a donor’s sperm.60 Recipients are also able to 
purchase additional units of sperm from the same donor for future use, 
which are kept at the sperm bank for an annual fee.61 
To resolve legal paternity, in cases where the sperm recipient is 
married, the husband must sign an affidavit declaring that he will be 
considered the father of the future child “for all intents and purposes,” 
including inheritance and alimony.62 In practice, however, “the husband 
is registered as the child’s father, and the donation is usually a secret 
shared by the couple and kept from the offspring themselves as well as 
from all other parties.”63 In the case of a known sperm donor, the circular 
states that both parties must enter into an agreement where the donor 
consents to the process and acknowledges his duties toward any resulting 
child, regardless of what he and the recipient may have agreed to 
separately.64 
Over the years since this practice became legally available, the Israeli 
reproductive regulators received calls to reverse its mandated anonymity 
 
57. Sperm Donation—Sperm Banks, supra note 51. To control this aspect of the practice, a 
national registry run by the health ministry documents only the donors’ information. CIRCULAR ON 
SPERM BANKS, supra note 47, at § 13. 
58. At first, the regulatory framework differentiated between married and single women by 
requiring unmarried women to be evaluated by a psychiatrist and a social worker to determine their 
eligibility for sperm donation. The case was settled after the state agreed to nullify these rules. See 
generally Judy Siegel-Itzkovich, Israeli Court Overturns IVF Treatment Rules, 314 BMJ 538 
(1997). 
59. CIRCULAR ON SPERM BANKS, supra note 47, at § 9(c). 
60. Id. at § 23(a)–(b). 
61. This possibility is also constructed through a form signed by the recipient and the sperm 
bank titled “Sperm Reservation Form.” 
62. CIRCULAR ON SPERM BANKS, supra note 47, at § 23(a)–(b). In 1980, the Israeli Supreme 
Court had to decide a case on a question not covered by the regulations, namely whether a husband 
who had given his consent to insemination procedures was liable for child support for the child 
conceived by sperm donation from a stranger. The Court ruled on contractual grounds that the 
husband was liable, without ever ruling on the question of fatherhood. As a principled solution for 
this matter, the above-mentioned consent forms for spouses were changed to include explicit 
undertaking of full legal responsibility over a child by the male spouse. See generally CA 449/79 
Salameh v. Salameh 34(2) PD 779 (1980) (Isr.). 
63. M. Wygoda, The Influence of Jewish Law on Israeli Regulation of Sperm Banks, 5 ETHICS, 
MED. & PUB. HEALTH 116, 118 (2018). In cases of children born to a single woman, there is no 
official registration of their paternal biological origin. Id. 
64. CIRCULAR ON SPERM BANKS, supra note 47, at § 31. 
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in sperm donation. These calls were similarly grounded in a concern for 
donor-conceived children’s rights to know their genetic origin.65F65 Vardit 
Ravitsky, a proponent of disclosure, recently argued that “novel 
technologies such as mitochondrial replacement and even gene editing 
raise new concerns in this area and may expand the scope of such a 
right.”66F66 Such calls have not materialized into legislative action to date, 
even though the Israeli legal system has come to recognize children as 
holding rights of their own, 67F67 for example, by endorsing the United 
Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child.68F68 
Finally, while the Israeli framework is rather comprehensive, 
especially when compared to its American counterpart, it is nonetheless 
based on administrative rules rather than primary legislation. This affects 
the validity of those regulations, if challenged. More importantly, without 
the formal deliberation process that characterizes primary legislation, 
these regulations leave unattended many issues that arise in this 
reproductive context, as illustrated by the case below.69 
B.  The Case 
In 2010, forty-three-year-old Doe, a single mother living in Florida, 
gave birth to her first-born daughter conceived through an anonymous 
sperm donation.70 Following the birth of her daughter, Doe purchased the 
option to use five additional sperm units from the same donor, to be kept 
at the Rambam Medical Center in Haifa, Israel, for an annual fee.71 On 
December 1, 2011, the sperm bank received a letter from the donor stating 
 
65. Ruth Zafran, “Secrets And Lies”—The Right of AID Offspring to Seek Out Their Biological 
Fathers, 35 MISHPATIM [HEBREW U. L.J.] 519, 532 (2005); Vardit Ravitsky, The Right to Know 
One’s Genetic Origins and Cross-Border Medically Assisted Reproduction, 6 ISR. J. HEALTH 
POL’Y RES. 1, 1 (2017). 
66. Ravitsky, supra note 65, at 1. 
67. See generally Tamar Morag, Children’s Rights in Israeli Case Law: A Spiral Progression, 
28 ISR. STUD. REV. 282 (2013) (discussing how the Israeli Supreme Court worked to develop 
children’s rights following the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child in the early 
1990s). 
68. See generally G.A. Res. 44/25, Convention on the Rights of the Child (Sept. 2, 1990), 
available at http://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/crc.aspx [https://perma.cc/ 
6AQW-FNQY] (outlining the rights of children ratified by the United Nations in the early 1990s). 
69. The growing popularity of artificial insemination from a donor in Israel and the ethical 
questions this reproductive practice raises have made pressing the need for unified and exhaustive 
legislation. In 2016, a proposed bill titled “Sperm Banks Law” was distributed by the Ministry of 
Health addressing several aspects of sperm donation that are left unresolved by the circulars, such 
as the number of women that may use the same donor, the disposition of sperm after the donor has 
died, and the establishment of a national database for children born through sperm donation. To 
date, however, the bill has not been made into law. Wygoda, supra note 63, at 122–23. 
70. The Doe Case, supra note 16, at 6. 
71. Id. Doe held both Israeli and American citizenships and had been a resident of the Unites 
States for seventeen years when filing her petition. 
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that he wished to discontinue any further use of his past sperm donations, 
because, among other reasons, he had become a ba’al teshuva (i.e., he 
had embraced the religious ultra-orthodox lifestyle).72 Shortly after 
receiving the letter, the bank notified Doe that she would no longer be 
able to use the additional sperm units she had reserved.73 Doe requested 
that the donation not be destroyed, and that she be allowed to exhaust 
other legal avenues.74 Doe then filed a petition with the Israeli Supreme 
Court against the respondents—The Health Ministry and The Sperm 
Bank—challenging the sperm bank’s decision to deny her access to the 
additional sperm units.75 
Very early on in the proceedings, the Israeli Supreme Court framed 
Doe as a case that could be decided through both a public and a private 
prism.76 The Court noted that the case raised questions touching on 
numerous juridical fields such as contract, property, and administrative 
law.77 Specifically, it saw that the legal issue in question could be 
resolved through both a contractual analysis and a rights-based (or 
balancing-of-interests) analysis.78 
The litigating parties included elements of both of these approaches in 
their claims and arguments. Doe’s claims, for example, focused on the 
infringement of her right to parenthood,79 but also on the contractual 
relationships established between the parties—a relationship that was 
based in principle on the consent forms both she and the donor had signed 
with the sperm bank.80 
All three residing Justices offered analyses that differed to some 
degree, but all were at least willing to recognize the forms signed by the 
litigating parties—the sperm bank, the donor, and Doe—as establishing 
some form of a valid contractual relationship among them. Writing the 
opinion of the Court, Justice Elyakim Rubinstein nevertheless found that 
“the most appropriate and correct perspective for a ruling on the issue” 
was through an analysis of the conflicting rights and interests that were 
 
72. Id. 
73. Id. at 7. 
74. Id. at 6. 
75. Id. at 10. The petition was initially filed against the Ministry of Health and the Sperm Bank. 
Later, the Court joined the donor as a respondent and requested that he respond to the petition. 
76. Id. at 11 (“As we have noted at the outset, this case raises questions of numerous fields of 
law. The issue may be looked at through the prism of contract law, property law, and, naturally, 
from the angle of administrative law. Each one of these perspectives may serve as fruitful grounds 
for a rich and innovative discussion.”). 
77. Id. 
78. Id. at 11–12, 31. 
79. Id. at 7. 
80. Id. at 8. 
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at stake for both the donor and the recipient.81 He then balanced the 
donor’s wish not to be a father against Doe’s interest in conceiving 
children who share the same genetic constitution,82 eventually finding 
that “precedence should be afforded to the donor’s position and to his 
personal autonomy.”83  
The Israeli Court’s reasoning will be discussed below in greater detail. 
However, note that by drawing on Doe the purpose here is not to suggest 
that the Israeli Supreme Court’s analysis should be applied in Teuscher’s 
case, as these arise in different legal contexts. What is more, the 
circumstances that led the Washington sperm bank to deny Danielle 
Teuscher access to her reserved vials differ from those in the Israeli 
example in that the recipient, and not the donor, is the one to have 
breached the contract she had entered with the bank. Rather, in the 
following paragraphs I use the Israeli example in order to identify some 
of the questions this novel type of reproductive dispute involving an 
anonymous sperm donation may give rise to. I then consider how these 
questions might be answered in the American legal context. 
III.  POSSIBLE LEGAL FRAMEWORKS 
Over the past two decades, two prevailing approaches for resolving 
reproductive disputes have gained a foothold, both of them introduced 
and developed in the context of frozen pre-embryo disposition disputes. 
The most famous among those is the 1992 case, Davis v. Davis.84 This 
Part provides a general description of each approach and how it applies 
to a dispute over an anonymous donor’s sperm vials. 
A.  The Contractual Approach 
After exhausting several other paths to parenthood, Junior Lewis Davis 
and Mary Sue Davis decided to undergo in vitro fertilization (IVF) 
treatments in order conceive a child.85 Several attempts at IVF over a 
period of three years did not result in a pregnancy.86 Before another 
transfer could be attempted, but after the couple opted to cryogenically 
preserve four pre-embryos, Junior Davis filed for divorce.87 During the 
divorce proceedings it became clear that the couple disagreed over the 
 
81. Id. at 11. 
82. Id. at 26. 
83. Id. at 4. 
84. See Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 597 (Tenn. 1992) (discussing which divorced spouse 
should have custody of the frozen embryos), aff’d on reh’g, 1992 WL 341632 (Tenn. Nov. 23, 
1992). 
85. Id. at 591. 
86. Id. at 591–92. 
87. Id. at 592. 
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disposition of their pre-embryos: Mary Sue sought to donate the pre-
embryos to a childless couple (at least at that point in time), while Junior 
Davis wanted them to be discarded. In its decision, the Supreme Court of 
Tennessee discussed two alternative paths for the resolution of the dispute 
before it, the “Enforceability of Contract”88 and “Balancing the Parties’ 
Interests.”89 
Under a contractual approach, the court will examine the agreements 
the parties have entered into, either with one another or with a fertility 
clinic in which the pre-embryos, or gametes, are in storage. More 
specifically, the court will look to honor any agreement that manifests the 
parties’ intentions regarding the disposition of the pre-embryos. Ideally, 
there would be an independent dispositional agreement, drafted and 
signed by the parties, in which they both explicitly expressed their 
dispositional choices in the event of divorce or other contingencies. In 
reality, however, service providers (e.g. fertility clinics) “require couples 
undergoing IVF to sign a cryopreservation consent or agreement. . . . 
These documents vary in their particulars, but typically ask patients to 
choose from a number of options for disposition under a variety of 
contingencies, such as death, divorce, or abandonment of the embryos.”90 
Courts have also considered whether an oral or an implied agreement can 
mandate a certain dispositional choice.91 
In the context of anonymous sperm donation, a contractual analysis is 
similarly likely to be based on the consent forms the donor and recipient 
have each signed with the sperm bank.92 These forms may or may not 
include provisions detailing the circumstances under which donors may 
withdraw consent for the use of their gametes at a later date.93 This is true 
for both the form or agreement signed by the donor and that signed by the 
recipient upon receiving the donation and/or reserving additional vials for 
future use. More often than not, however, “[m]en who donate sperm 
through a sperm bank typically relinquish their rights without time limits. 
Nor are they offered the opportunity to revoke consent to use of the sperm 
at a later date, though clinics have on occasion honored a request by the 
 
88. Id. at 597. 
89. Id. at 603. 
90. Deborah L. Forman, Embryo Disposition and Divorce: Why Clinic Consent Forms Are Not 
the Answer, 24 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIM. LAWS. 57, 58–59 (2011) [hereinafter Forman, Clinic 
Consent Forms]. 
91. See generally Szafranski v. Dunston, 34 N.E.3d 1132, 1147–53 (Ill. App. Ct. 2015); Davis, 
842 S.W.2d 588. 
92. Deborah L. Forman, Embryo Disposition, Divorce & Family Law Contracting: A Model for 
Enforceability, 24 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 378, 396 (2013) [hereinafter Forman, Enforceability]. 
93. Id. at 401. 
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donor to no longer sell the sperm.”94 This seems odd considering how 
changes in one’s personal circumstances may affect their decision to act 
as an anonymous sperm donor.95 Indeed, some countries have long 
protected a donors’ right to withdraw consent to the use of their gametes, 
including the United Kingdom, which has done so since 1991.96 
In a contractual analysis of anonymous sperm donation, courts must 
also consider the lack of a direct contractual relationship between the 
donors and recipients. As illustrated both in Teuscher’s case and in Doe, 
there is no “contractual adversary” between the donor and the recipient.97 
At least in the latter case, Doe did try to argue that she was a third party 
to the contract entered into by the donor and sperm bank;98 however, the 
Court rejected this claim.99 
B.  The Balancing Test Approach 
The court in Davis v. Davis decided to resolve the case by balancing 
the various rights at stake for Mary Sue Davis and for Junior Davis. In 
doing so, the court considered “the positions of the parties, the 
significance of their interests, and the relative burdens that will be 
imposed by differing resolutions.”100 
In that particular instance, while the case was moving through the 
lower courts, Mary Sue had intended to use the pre-embryos herself; but 
by the time the Supreme Court of Tennessee was considering the case, 
she had changed her mind, instead asking to donate them to a childless 
couple.101 Junior was “adamantly opposed to such donation” and wanted 
the frozen pre-embryos discarded.102 The court weighed the couple’s 
competing interests under each of these scenarios, and found that in both 
instances Junior’s right not to procreate would prevail.103 
Most reproductive disputes, and certainly that in Teuscher’s case, 
present the court with a similar task of balancing different aspects of 
 
94. Id. This is also true for procedures such as the “cryopreservation (freezing) of gametes and 
embryos to provide treatment options for excess reproductive tissues and to aid with fertility 
preservation.” Cynthia E. Fruchtman, Withdrawal of Cryopreserved Sperm, Eggs, and Embryos, 
48 FAM. L.Q. 197, 197 (2014). 
95. Guido Pennings & Veerle Provoost, The Attitude of Female Students Towards Sperm 
Donation by Their Partner, 36 J. ASSISTED REPROD. & GENETICS 1431, 1432 (2019). 
96. Peter D. Sozou et al., Withdrawal of Consent by Sperm Donors, 339 BMJ 975, 975 (2009). 
97. The Doe Case, supra note 16, at 54. 
98. Id. at 8. 
99. Id. at 31. 
100. See Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 603 (Tenn. 1992) (quoting the discussion in the 
balancing the parties’ interests), aff’d on reh’g, 1992 WL 341632 (Tenn. Nov. 23, 1992). 
101. Id. at 590. 
102. Id. 
103. Id. at 604. 
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procreative autonomy.104 In Doe, the fact that procreative rights were at 
stake was central to the Israeli Court’s decision to choose the balancing 
test approach over the contractual one. It found that “intimate questions 
of human life” deserve a constitutional analysis of the rights at stake,105 
and rejected the proposition that the “case of sperm donation attests to a 
choice to follow a . . . ‘businesslike’ or ‘financial’” path to parenthood, 
“of the type that grants security that is not extant in an intimate set of 
understandings.”106 
These determinations about the centrality of procreative decisions to 
the lives of individuals allude to some principal arguments against the 
application of the contractual approach to resolve reproductive disputes, 
which will be discussed below. For now, note that applying the balancing 
test requires answering at least two more questions: first, about the rights 
each party to the reproductive dispute has at stake; and second, about the 
harms that may flow from infringing upon these rights. These two 
questions will be discussed in turn. 
IV.  THE RIGHTS AT STAKE 
It follows from the overview of the balancing test approach, that before 
such a test can be used to weigh the conflicting rights at stake, these rights 
need to be identified. Even more fundamental, understanding the nature 
of the rights at stake may be an integral part of deciding which of the 
approaches is the best approach to apply to begin with. As discussed later 
on, classifying the right not to become a parent as inalienable, for 
example, may lead a court to reject the contractual approach and to 
employ the balancing test instead.107 This section looks at several ways 
in which the rights of the parties may be framed, in each case possibly 
leading to considerably different results. 
A.  The Right Not to Procreate 
In a series of Supreme Court cases dating back to 1942, procreative 
liberty has been constitutionally recognized through case law identifying 
marriage and procreation as fundamental rights.108 A “zone of privacy 
 
104. See, e.g., Mary Ziegler, Beyond Balancing: Rethinking the Law of Embryo Disposition, 68 
AM. U. L. REV. 515, 518 (2018) (exploring the history of the balancing test in the context of 
abortion law). 
105. The Doe Case, supra note 16, at 27. 
106. Id. at 19. 
107. Id. 
108. See, e.g., Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (holding that 
sterilization as punishment for stealing was unconstitutional); see generally Eisenstadt v. Baird, 
405 U.S. 438 (1972). 
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created by several fundamental constitutional guarantees,”109 the Court 
explained, provides individuals with a right “to be free from unwarranted 
governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person 
as the decision whether to bear or beget a child.”110 Developed primarily 
through cases addressing the use of contraceptives, this zone is generally 
understood to encompass both the right to procreate and the right not to 
procreate. 
Following this basic premise, at least in the context of pre-embryo 
disputes, “courts and commentators have invoked a monolithic ‘right not 
to procreate.’”111 For example in Reber v. Reiss, the Pennsylvania 
Superior Court had to decide who should receive the thirteen pre-embryos 
Bret Reber and Andrea Reiss created after the latter was diagnosed with 
breast cancer.112 The couple separated and then divorced, but could not 
agree over the disposition of the pre-embryos.113 In ruling for the wife 
(who otherwise could not have become a genetic parent), the court 
analyzed the husband’s interest in “avoiding unwanted procreation.”114 
In response to the husband’s concerns about the financial responsibility 
he may bear toward the resulting child and the level of involvement he 
may have in the child’s life, the court explained that he would be relieved 
of any financial obligation and could choose whether to be part of their 
life or not.115 Nevertheless, it did not consider how these different 
scenarios might interfere with different aspects of his procreational 
liberty. Indeed, in most of these cases state courts have ruled in favor of 
the party claiming the right not to procreate, relying on the 
abovementioned Supreme Court cases.116 
Critical of this monolithic view of the right not to procreate, Professor 
I. Glenn Cohen developed a competing framework that identifies “a 
bundle of rights having multiple possible sticks, consisting of a right not 
to be a gestational, legal, and genetic parent.”117 According to this 
framework, pre-embryo disposition disputes typically present a conflict 
between “her right to be a genetic, gestational, and legal parent” and “his 
 
109. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965). 
110. Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 453. 
111. Cohen, Genetic Parent, supra note 15, at 1118; see also I. Glenn Cohen, The Constitution 
and the Rights Not to Procreate, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1135, 1136–37 (2008) (arguing that authorities 
“err by relying on a monolithic conception of the right not to procreate”) [hereinafter Cohen, The 
Constitution]. 
112. Reber v. Reiss, 42 A.3d 1131, 1132–33 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2012). 
113. Id. 
114. Id. at 1140. 
115. Id. at 1140–42. 
116. I. Glenn Cohen & Eli Y. Adashi, Embryo Disposition Disputes: Controversies and Case 
Law, 46 HASTINGS CTR. REP. 13, 14 (2016); Cohen, The Constitution, supra note 111, at 1137–38. 
117. Cohen, Genetic Parent, supra note 15, at 1121. 
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right not to be a genetic (and possibly legal) parent.”118 Following the 
same logic, a case of anonymous sperm donation would likely present a 
conflict between the right to be a genetic, gestational, and legal parent 
and the right not to be a genetic parent.119 
In Doe, which involved an anonymous sperm donor, the Israeli Court 
similarly considered the different possible “fatherly contexts,” noting that 
under a regime of anonymity, “the donor owes no financial, social or 
other duty to the infant.”120 In fact, the Court explained, “it is not at all 
clear if and how the donor would know that he became a father, since, as 
aforesaid, this is subject to the success of the medical procedure, and 
without an inquiry on his part he will not learn about it.”121 But even 
though the Court held that it was not the “core” right not to be a parent 
that was at stake, it nonetheless found the “genetic element of 
parenthood” to be constitutionally protected under Israeli law by the right 
of autonomy.122 
In the United States, it is still unclear whether the “naked” right not to 
be a genetic parent should be granted the status of a constitutionally 
protected right. At least according to Cohen, the answer is no. Supreme 
Court decisions on access to contraception and abortion, he posits, should 
not be seen as recognizing a fundamental constitutional right not to be a 
genetic parent.123 Instead, they should be viewed as “establishing a 
fundamental right against state interference with the collective decision 
of both parties to prevent procreation but not a right by one party as 
against the other party to prevent procreation.”124 According to Cohen, 
neither does abortion jurisprudence recognize an overarching right not be 
a genetic parent, since it is concerned with the right not to be a gestational 
parent and with freedom against bodily intrusion.125 This line of 
reasoning suggests that “an individual does not violate the Constitution 
 
118. Cohen, The Constitution, supra note 111, at 1144. 
119. This characterization of the conflicting rights assumes, first, that the sperm recipient 
intends on gestating the pregnancy herself rather than use a surrogate. And second, that the state 
regulatory framework governing parentage allows for sperm donors to be relinquished of their 
parental obligations. As discussed in Part I above, at least when it comes to single persons using an 
anonymous donation, most states do terminate the parental rights of the donors. 
120. The Doe Case, supra note 16, at 22. 
121. Id. 
122. Id. 
123. Cohen, The Constitution, supra note 111, at 1154. 
124. Id. This argument raises several questions that I do not discuss in this article, concerned 
with the type of actions procreative rights protect individuals from, such as private or state actions. 
According to Cohen, “enforcement of agreements to become a genetic parent, such as . . . 
agreements to provide sperm or egg, over contemporaneous objection, does not constitute state 
action raising a constitutional issue.” Id. at 1174. This is another argument Cohen makes against 
treating the right not to be a genetic parent as a fundamental right. 
125. Id. at 1154–65. 
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by making another individual a genetic (but only genetic) parent against 
his or her will.”126 Therefore, a court might be able to compel, for 
example, Danielle Teuscher’s sperm donor to become a genetic parent 
even though he later withdrew consent to the use of his sperm. 
Whether courts decide to embrace this framework or not, an important 
first step is to recognize and differentiate among the elements of parental 
rights that are at stake, and only then turn to the process of balancing them 
against the other. This is especially true in the context of sperm donation, 
which relies on the law’s ability to acknowledge models of parenthood 
other than that of genetic parenthood. 
B.  The Right to Procreate 
When considering the right to procreate, in the context of sperm 
donation, the question is which procreative right a recipient would 
exercise when attempting to use a specific donor’s sperm. One answer to 
this question is that all elements of the right to procreate are at stake, since 
in most cases recipients wish to become genetic, legal, and gestational 
parents.127 Thus, denying them access to the sperm of their choice 
interferes with each of these rights. Another way to answer this question 
is to consider whether the recipient could possibly become a genetic, 
legal, and/or gestational parent through means other than the disputed 
sperm. 
Although most courts resolving pre-embryo disputes have opted for 
the latter,128 distinguishing these answers highlights the difficulty of 
determining the scope of the right to procreate. This is due in part to the 
development of reproductive technologies that provide novel ways to 
exercise this right.129 As one scholar noted in this context, “[i]n a pre-
ART world, procreation was fundamentally (perhaps irrevocably) linked 
to sexual activity.”130 Despite the prevalence of assisted reproduction as 
an accepted form of procreation, “courts and legislatures have continued 
to shy away from explicit consideration of the nature of the right to 
procreate with technological assistance.”131 This area is also relatively 
undertheorized within scholarly writing.132 
 
126. Id. at 1167. 
127. For male recipients, the rights at stake are limited to the first two. 
128. See, e.g., Findley v. Lee, No. FDI-13-780539, at 61–65 (Cal. Super. Ct. Jan. 11, 2016), 
(considering that the Respondent has not established that she is infertile at the age of forty-six but 
she has established that she has between a 0 to 5 percent chance of a live birth). 
129. See generally Kimberly M. Mutcherson, Procreative Pluralism, 30 BERKELEY J. GENDER, 
L. & JUST. 22 (2015). 
130. Id. at 56. 
131. Id. at 24–25. 
132. See, e.g., id.; Carter J. Dillard, Rethinking the Procreative Right, 10 YALE HUM. RTS. & 
DEV. J. 1 (2007). 
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While a discussion over the meaning of the right to procreate is beyond 
the scope of this article, one basic question that has yet to be thoroughly 
answered is whether procreative liberty extends to donor-assisted 
reproduction. According to Professor John Robertson,133 the answer is 
yes. 
The couple’s interest in reproducing is the same, no matter how 
conception occurs, for the values and interests underlying coital 
reproduction are equally present. Both coital and noncoital conception 
enable the couple to unite egg and sperm and thus acquire a child of 
their genes and gestation for rearing . . . . The use of noncoital 
techniques such as IVF or artificial insemination to unite egg and 
husband’s sperm, made necessary by the couple’s infertility, should 
then also be protected.134 
Such an extensive view of procreative liberty has been criticized for 
reading too much into the US Supreme Court decision in Skinner v. 
Oklahoma; as some suggest, recognizing a negative right to procreate 
“does not imply a positive right to call upon the apparatus of the state for 
assistance in procreation.”135 Furthermore, 
even if Skinner does create a constitutional right to be free from state 
interference with the use of reproductive technology, it does not follow 
that the state possesses an affirmative obligation to assure the exercise 
of procreative choice by placing its prestige and power behind the 
enforcement of preconception contracts.136 
Even assuming that the right to procreate extends to assisted 
reproduction, a further question is whether that right encompasses the 
right to procreate using the gametes of a specific donor. As suggested 
above, if cases that involve pre-embryo disputes are any indication, 
analysis of the right to procreate has been concerned with the general 
 
133. Of the scholars that did grapple with this question over the years, John A. Robertson has 
been particularly prolific, repeatedly arguing that the protected right to procreate includes the right 
to use assisted reproduction. See, e.g., John A. Robertson, Assisted Reproductive Technology and 
the Family, 47 HASTINGS L.J. 911, 914 (1996) (“Since an infertile couple or individual has the 
same interest in bearing and rearing offspring as a fertile couple does, their right to use noncoital 
techniques to treat infertility should have equivalent respect.”); see John A. Robertson, Gay and 
Lesbian Access to Assisted Reproductive Technology, 55 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 323, 328 (2004) 
(“If coital reproduction is protected, then we might reasonably expect the courts to protect the right 
of infertile persons to use noncoital means of reproduction to combine their gametes, such as 
artificial insemination (AI), in vitro fertilization (IVF), and related techniques.”); see also John A. 
Robertson, Embryos, Families, and Procreative Liberty: The Legal Structure of the New 
Reproduction, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 939, 956 n.53 (1986) [hereinafter Robertson, Embryos, Families] 
(“Thus, persons desiring to reproduce may have a right to receive gametes and gestation from 
others, even if the others have no independent right to provide those services.”). 
134. Robertson, Embryos, Families, supra note 133, at 960. 
135. Radhika Rao, Constitutional Misconceptions, 93 MICH. L. REV. 1473, 1485 (1995) 
(reviewing JOHN A. ROBERTSON, CHILDREN OF CHOICE: FREEDOM AND THE NEW REPRODUCTIVE 
TECHNOLOGIES (1994)). 
136. Id. 
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ability to become a parent, by any means, not with the choice of some 
particular sperm. Indeed, in Davis, the Tennessee Supreme Court noted 
that Mary Sue Davis could “achieve parenthood in all its aspects—
genetic, gestational, bearing, and rearing” through IVF.137 The court 
suggested that it would have been a closer call if she was seeking to use 
the pre-embryos herself, but only if she could not become a parent by any 
means other than the disputed pre-embryos.138 Put differently, the court 
might have weighed her right to procreate differently in relation to 
Junior’s interest in avoiding parenthood if it would implicate her ability 
to become a parent at all. The court did not, however, confront the 
specific question of whether the right to assisted procreation is 
constitutionally protected in the context of pre-embryo disputes.139 
Similar reasoning runs through the Doe decision, where the Israeli 
Supreme Court expressed reservations about a broad interpretation of the 
right to procreate.140 Specifically, the Court posited that Doe’s “core” 
right to parenthood was not at stake, since her overall ability to become a 
parent was still available; Doe was “healthy and fit to bring a child into 
this world and is not bound . . . to the Donor in the case at bar. She is able 
to act soon to receive another sperm donation at her preferred timing for 
undergoing additional insemination treatments.”141 Against her claim 
that “impingement upon the ability to choose with whom to bring 
children into this world is sufficient in order to be sheltered by the legal 
right to parenthood,” the Court reiterated that “at most” her interest in 
using the sperm of this particular anonymous donor is protected by her 
right to autonomy, though it was “highly doubtful.”142 Framing the right 
she claimed as a “right to a child having a specific genetic constitution,” 
the Court held that in these circumstances, her interest “is not recognized 
by law and is not protectable.”143 
 
137. Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 604 (Tenn. 1992), aff’d on reh’g, 1992 WL 341632 
(Tenn. Nov. 23, 1992). 
138. Id. 
139. Another differentiation that I do not make here is between negative and positive rights. In 
the context of assisted conception, a negative right would protect against interference with 
accessing reproductive practices such as sperm donation or surrogacy, while a positive right would 
require the state or other individuals to provide the means, such as funding, needed in order to 
engage with them. See, e.g., Robertson, Embryos, Families, supra note 133, at 966 n.83 
(“[P]rocreative liberty is (like most constitutional rights) a negative—not a positive—right.”). 
140. Again, to be clear, the purpose here is not to suggest that the Israeli Supreme Court’s 
framing of the right should be employed in the American context as well. Rather, it is to get a sense 
of the nuances and unique considerations the case of sperm donation brings to the discussion over 
the right to procreate. 
141. The Doe Case, supra note 16, at 18. 
142. Id. 
143. Id. at 18–19, 26. 
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In the American context, where one’s reproductive decisions are 
protected by a zone of privacy, there is perhaps more merit to the claim 
that Danielle Teuscher’s fundamental reproductive liberty is at stake; 
because she had already used the sperm once to conceive a child, denying 
her access to the reserved vials does amount to interfering with her 
reproductive plans. Still, in a more recent case, the Colorado Court of 
Appeals found that the wife’s interest in having a fourth child who carried 
the same genetic constituency as her other children was outweighed by 
the husband’s “corresponding and equal rights . . . to determine that he 
does not want to have additional children who are joint genetic offspring 
of husband and wife.”144 This decision was later reversed and remanded 
by the Colorado Supreme Court. While the court did not directly address 
the interest of having children who are “full siblings,” it did find that 
while weighing the parties interests at stake “the sheer number of a 
party’s existing children, standing alone,” may not be a reason to deny 
the requesting party the preservation or use of the pre-embryos.145 At the 
same time, the court made clear that courts should consider “a party’s 
demonstrated ability, or inability, to become a genetic parent through 
means other than the use of the pre-embryos,” but may not consider 
“whether the party seeking to become a genetic parent using the pre-
embryos could instead adopt a child or otherwise parent non-biological 
children.”146 
V.  REPRODUCTIVE HARMS 
Whichever formulation courts decide to use when analyzing the rights 
at stake in sperm donation disputes, it is important to also consider how 
these rights weigh against one other. In Davis, the court suggested that as 
a rule “the party wishing to avoid procreation should prevail, assuming 
that the other party has a reasonable possibility of achieving parenthood 
by means other than use of the pre-embryos in question.”147 In practice, 
courts have tended to conduct “a fact-intensive inquiry into each party’s 
interest in using or preventing the use of the pre-embryos.”148 
Such case-by-case inquiries are meant to elucidate the harms that 
would be imposed on each party to the reproductive dispute, in the 
 
144. In re Marriage of Rooks, 2016 WL 6123561, at *7 (Colo. App. Oct. 20, 2016), rev’d, 429 
P.3d 579 (Colo. 2018). 
145. In re Marriage of Rooks, 429 P.3d 579, 581 (Colo. 2018). 
146. Id. at 595. 
147. Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 604 (Tenn. 1992), aff’d on reh’g, 1992 WL 341632 
(Tenn. Nov. 23, 1992). 
148. Szafranski v. Dunston, 34 N.E.3d 1132, 1162 (Ill. App. Ct. 2015); see also Cohen, Genetic 
Parent, supra note 15, at 1144 (suggesting that one mechanism to resolve these conflicts is a 
“balancing device,” not at the categorical level, but at the level of a particular case taking into 
account idiosyncratic facts that might determine whose interest we should favor). 
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context of their life circumstances.149 As such, this discussion can be 
understood as part of the balancing-of-interests analysis. However, 
comparing the burdens “that unwanted reproduction . . . would cause the 
objecting party, and the burdens that refusing to enforce the agreement” 
would cause to the party wishing to use the gametes, is also part of 
evaluating the desirability of enforcing such agreements.150 Separating 
this part from the categorical discussion of the conflicting interests gives 
rise to several practical insights into the reproductive harms entailed in 
Teuscher’s and similar cases. 
A.  Harm to the Donor 
Discussing the harm that would be imposed on the donor if he became 
a genetic parent against his wish, the Israeli Supreme Court found that 
the  
harm to a man, as a result of his feeling . . . that a child who is the fruit 
of his loins “walks about the world,” and he is unable or unwilling, 
whether on religious grounds or in terms of the resources of time and 
emotion, to dedicate his love and attention to him—is inevitable, and 
touches upon his subjective moral conscience.151  
These findings were grounded, in part, in a letter the donor addressed 
to the Court in which he explained that sperm donation “is presently 
incompatible with my world view . . . I am not interested in having a child 
born by me, without me being able to give him love, and without me 
loving his mother.”152 
Although the Israeli Court framed the harm as particularly grave 
considering the donor’s religious lifestyle, quite similar 
conceptualizations of the harms that forced genetic parenthood might 
impose on individuals are also found in pre-embryo disposition cases in 
the US. In Davis, for example, the court explained that “[t]he impact that 
this unwanted parenthood would have on Junior Davis can only be 
 
149. While I do not discuss here the interests of children born to a sperm donor in having full 
genetic siblings, an argument can be made that having children from the same sperm donor will 
benefit the existing child and any future child, rather than having another donor brought into the 
family unit. See, e.g., Lucy Frith & Eric Blyth, The Point of No Return: Up to What Point Should 
We Be Allowed to Withdraw Consent to the Storage and Use of Embryos and Gametes?, 33 
BIOETHICS 637, 640 (2019); Eric Blyth, Steve Lui & Lucy Frith, Relationships and Boundaries 
Between Provider and Recipient Families Following Embryo Adoption, 8 FAM. RELATIONSHIPS & 
SOC’YS 267 (2017). 
150. John A. Robertson, Precommitment Strategies for Disposition of Frozen Embryos, 50 
EMORY L.J. 989, 1019 (2001) [hereinafter Robertson, Precommitment Strategies]. 
151. The Doe Case, supra note 16, at 23–24. Statements of this sort feature throughout the 
decision, for example: “[I]t is hard for [the donor] to feel that the children to be born by his donation 
will not be his children, nor will they have the benefit of his affection, nor will they be the fruit of 
his love.” Id. at 24. 
152. Id. at 23. 
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understood by considering his particular circumstances.”153 Fifth 
youngest of six children, Junior’s parents divorced when he was five 
years old. After his mother had a nervous break-down, “he and three of 
his brothers went to live at a home for boys run by the Lutheran Church. 
From that day forward, he had monthly visits with his mother but saw his 
father only three more times before he died in 1976.”154 These “boyhood 
experiences” led the court to conclude that Junior would “face a lifetime 
of either wondering about his parental status or knowing about his 
parental status but having no control over it.”155 
In both instances, the potential psychological or emotional harms 
proved consequential to the courts’ final rulings in favor of the sperm 
provider. Similar concerns regarding the consequences of genetic 
parenthood are contemplated in arguments against employing the 
contractual approach in reproductive disputes, which will be discussed 
below. Yet this type of harm can also be conceptualized in general terms, 
without reference to one’s particular life circumstances. In the same 
article where he offers to unbundle the right not to be a parent into three 
separate rights, Professor Cohen also conceives the idea of “attributional 
parenthood.”156 This term refers to a “residual social category of 
parenthood” that persists regardless of any financial and care 
responsibilities this title may entail.157 In pre-embryo disputes, Cohen 
argues, “three categories of people might nonetheless attribute 
parenthood writ large to an individual because of his or her genetic 
parenthood of the child: those outside the relationship, the resulting child, 
and the individual himself.”158 This type of emotional distress damage 
rests on the convention that connects genetic parenthood and attributional 
parenthood.159 
In the context of sperm donation, the extent of the harm attributional 
parenthood may impose on the donor may vary from one case to another. 
The extent of harm depends on whether, for example, the sperm recipient 
decides to disclose the identity of the donor to the future child or other 
third parties such as friends and family: 
[I]n a regime where one is told whether one’s sperm has been used to 
successfully produce a child, but not given the child’s identity (and vice 
versa), the sperm provider may perceive himself to be the father of a 
 
153. Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 603–04 (Tenn. 1992), aff’d on reh’g, 1992 WL 341632 
(Tenn. Nov. 23, 1992). 
154. Id. 
155. Id. at 604. 
156. Cohen, Genetic Parent, supra note 15, at 1134–45. 
157. Id. at 1135. 
158. Id. at 1136. 
159. Id. at 1140–41. 
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genetic child he never wanted . . . but he is not forced to confront the 
perception by the child or third parties that he is the father.160 
There is, however, room to question the existence of such harm for 
anonymous sperm donors, or at least its severity. The decision to become 
a donor in the first place means that at some point in their lives, sperm 
donors were unbothered by the idea that they would have genetically 
related children with whom they would have no relationship or contact. 
Indeed, in arguing in favor of “uncoupling” biological and psychological 
parenthood in frozen pre-embryo disputes, Professor Ellen Waldman 
draws on data about sperm donors to show that “biological ties can exist 
absent psychological attachment.”161 But as Cohen rightly notes, these 
studies do not account for cases like Teuscher and Doe, where donors 
wished to discontinue further use of their sperm, have knowledge of the 
actual past and future use of their sperm, and have lost their anonymity. 
Still, recognizing that people have different views about the burden or 
obligation that may result from genetic reproduction (and that these views 
may change throughout a person’s life), requires careful consideration of 
the meaning genetic parenthood in each particular case, rather than basing 
decisions on preconceived ideas. 
Other harms courts considered in reproductive disputes are financial in 
nature. In Findley v. Lee, the California Supreme Court weighed 
Findley’s right not to procreate against his ex-wife Lee’s right to 
procreate.162 According to Findley, the only reason Lee wanted to have 
these children was to “blackmail and extort money from him in the 
future.”163 Even though the court eventually ruled in favor of Findley, it 
rejected this claim because California’s child support system would make 
it “highly unlikely” that Lee would be able to extort more money from 
him.164 In the context of sperm donation, this harm is unlikely to carry 
much weight either because most states release anonymous sperm donors 
from any financial liability toward the resulting child.165 
Becoming a genetic parent, even if it does not carry any legal or 
financial liability, may also affect gamete providers’ current or future 
relationships. In Szafranski v. Dunston, Jacob Szafranski, the party asking 
to discard the pre-embryos that he had created with his ex-girlfriend, 
Karla Dunston, grounded his objection in the impact that using them 
 
160. Id. at 1140. 
161. Ellen Waldman, The Parent Trap: Uncovering the Myth of Coerced Parenthood in Frozen 
Embryo Disputes, 53 AM. U. L. REV. 1021 (2004). 
162. Findley v. Lee, No. FDI-13-780539, 2016 WL 270083, at *2 (Cal. Super. Jan. 11, 2016). 
163. Id. at *33. 
164. Id. at *36. 
165. See supra Part I. 
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would have on his other relationships.166 Although the couple had no 
plans to get married, when Karla was diagnosed with cancer and was 
about to lose her fertility, Jacob agreed to provide her with his sperm in 
order to create pre-embryos.167 After the couple separated, Karla wished 
to use the pre-embryos, but Jacob objected.168 In his testimony, Jacob 
explained that he already lost one “love interest” because of this legal 
dispute and that he was “worried that no one will want to have a 
relationship with him knowing that he has fathered a child” under such 
circumstances.169 
This concern over the effect of unwanted genetic parenthood on the 
donor’s intimate relationships is especially relevant in the context of 
anonymous sperm donation, since donors often do not disclose to their 
partners the fact that they have donated sperm. One study examining 
attitudes about sperm donation found that while the majority of its 
respondents would inform and involve their partner in the decision to 
donate, “future partners would less often be informed than current 
partners.”170 That same study found that “[a]lmost 40% of the 
respondents feared that the donation might have a negative impact on 
their current or future relationship.”171 
Indeed, in Doe the donor explained that in the time since he had 
provided the donation he got married and had a son, and that he was “not 
interested in adding injury to his wife . . . by adding a terrible uncertainty 
to their lives.”172 Still, the Court did not take this particular harm into 
account in its decision. In Szafranski, the Illinois Appellate Court held 
that Jacob’s concerns are “risks that both parties faced and knowingly 
accepted in agreeing to undergo IVF.”173 The same may be argued with 
regard to parties who agreed to donate sperm. 
B.  Harm to the Recipient 
In pre-embryo disposition disputes, the discussion over potential 
harms to the party attempting to exercise his or her right to procreate 
usually centers on whether that party is able to achieve parenthood 
through some means other than the disputed pre-embryos. As explained 
 
166. Szafranski v. Dunston, 34 N.E.3d 1132, 1162 (Ill. App. Ct. 2015). 
167. Id. at 1137–38. 
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above, this harm has been considered most severe if a ruling in favor of 
the other party meant that the requesting party would not be able to have 
genetic children at all. In Findley v. Lee, discussed above, the California 
Supreme Court dedicated most of its analysis of the interests at stake for 
Lee to the question whether she “suffers from age-related infertility.”174 
After engaging with several studies and with testimony from fertility 
doctors, the court concluded that “Lee is unable to establish that she is 
now infertile per se. . . . However, the evidence did establish that at best 
she has between a 0 to 5 percent chance of a live birth.”175 In contrast, 
where sperm recipients are requesting the use of reserved vials, unless 
they were already fertilized, the recipient’s chance of becoming a genetic 
parent would not be affected by either granting or denying access to the 
reserved sperm. The question of infertility is thus unlikely to arise. 
Yet another set of harms concern the health risks that harvesting eggs 
and IVF impose on women in particular.176 While these are irrelevant if 
recipients opt to conceive through artificial insemination, they may 
nonetheless apply if, for example, a recipient freezes her eggs and 
reserves additional sperm vials with the hope of using both of the stored 
gametes to produce children in the future. 
Sperm donation also does not require the same level of financial 
investment that IVF does. “A single vial of sperm can cost $700, and, 
depending on insurance coverage, each round of AI performed by a 
doctor can cost over $1000, with women typically needing to undergo 
numerous rounds of insemination before it is successful.”177 In 
comparison, in 2016, the minimum price of an IVF cycle in the United 
States ranged from $12,000 to $15,000.178 Additional procedures and 
tests, including assisted hatching, embryo freezing, and preimplantation 
genetic diagnosis can add another $5000 to $15,000 to that price.179 The 
cost of the sperm vials themselves, in addition to the costs associated with 
browsing, freezing, and storing may nonetheless amount to thousands of 
dollars.180 
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Notwithstanding the health risks and financial investment sperm 
donation may entail, another category of harms centers on intangible or 
psychological harms possibly inflicted on sperm recipients if access to 
the gametes they reserved is denied. There is, for example, the emotional 
investment the recipient made in choosing the donor, which “is often a 
stressful and time-consuming process and is usually not a quick or casual 
decision.”181 Although scholarship on people’s experience with choosing 
a sperm donor is limited, existing writing points out the complexity of 
such decision and the importance some perspective parents attribute to 
it.182 Many women even describe having felt some sense of connection 
to a specific donor, which guided them in choosing a donor.183  
To better understand the harms to the sperm recipient, it is perhaps 
helpful to consider the harms resulting from what Professor Dov Fox has 
called “confounded procreation.”184 Developed in the context of 
reproductive negligence, i.e. the negligent supply of reproductive 
services by medical professionals, this term encompasses cases where 
plaintiffs ended up with a child having different genetic traits than they 
wished for.185 It happens “when reproductive professionals fertilize 
patients with the wrong sperm, implant another couple’s embryos, 
misrepresent donor information, or misdiagnose fetuses.”186 These 
“mishaps” result in injury “to reasonable expectations of control over the 
selection of offspring particulars that people project would make the 
parenting experience more worthwhile for them.”187 According to Fox 
this is particularly true about genetic trait preferences pertaining to the 
biological relationships of children to parents,188 yet it may also be 
relevant to the biological relationship between siblings. The existence 
and severity of the harm depends on how it may impair their life “from 
the perspective of their own (not illegitimate) values and 
circumstances.”189 
In the case of sperm donation, there appears to be a preference among 
parents and aspiring parents toward using the same sperm donor for their 
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children. Some parents reason that “children with physical resemblances 
made it visible to society that the children were siblings and thus that they 
were part of the same family.”190 According to such view, genetic 
relatedness is as an indicator of familial relationships.191 Paradoxically, 
“while gamete donation allows for detachment of social parenthood from 
biological relatedness,” it also seems to reaffirm biological notions of 
kinship.192 Others want to use the same sperm donor because they believe 
that genetic relatedness leads to positive sibling relations.193 Parents also 
cited medical reasons, explaining that children who are full genetic 
siblings could donate organs to each other if necessary.194 These 
justifications, however, are not indisputable. For example, there is doubt 
whether genetic relatedness does contribute to better sibling relations, or 
“that genetic siblings are equally prone (or even more prone) to argue 
with each other than non-genetically related siblings.”195 
Lastly, this account of the harm Teuscher may bear as a result of the 
sperm bank’s decision will not be complete without considering its 
gendered dimensions. As professor Carol Sanger explains in her critical 
response to Fox’s article, “many men and women experience procreation 
disruptions differently,” and “the measure of disappointment is not 
gender neutral.”196 For example, women struggling with infertility are 
“more likely than men to report depression and anxiety symptoms . . . , 
and respond more poorly following treatment failure.”197 In the case at 
hand, accounting for such gendered harms means considering why 
Danielle, and other similarly situated women, sought motherhood 
through sperm donation, and what choosing this reproductive route has 
meant for them. It may also mean considering the social context in which 
the choice of becoming a single mother via sperm donation is made. One 
recent study exploring the narratives of single women contemplating 
becoming mothers through sperm donation in the United Kingdom found 
that this decision “provoked much anxiety and ambivalence for the 
participants . . . , with solo motherhood perceived as a ‘risk’ to the 
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construct of a ‘good mother.’”198 Single women “considered, negotiated 
and accounted for the ‘risks’ solo motherhood may pose for their child: 
namely, being raised in a family departing from the nuclear family and 
not knowing their ‘genetic origins.’”199 Such narratives elucidate just 
how much may be at stake for women who pursue motherhood via sperm 
donation, and in turn how much may be lost if it is denied. 
VI.  CHOOSING A LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
While both the contractual and balancing test frameworks may be used 
to resolve disputes over the disposition of pre-embryos, the Tennessee 
Supreme Court in Davis posited that the balancing test should only come 
into play when no prior agreement exists.200 The court found that 
agreements regarding disposition of pre-embryos in the event of 
contingencies such as death or divorce, should be presumed valid and 
enforced between the parties, reasoning that “the progenitors, having 
provided the gametic material giving rise to the pre-embryos, retain 
decision-making authority as to their disposition.”201 It further 
recognized that such agreements may be modified at a later stage but only 
by an agreement.202 The court nevertheless found no agreement between 
Mary Sue and Junior Davis over the disposition of their frozen pre-
embryos and therefore resorted to the balancing test to resolve the dispute 
at hand. 
In several of the cases that followed Davis, involving similar facts, 
courts have tried to follow the scheme laid out by this decision.203 In 
others, as well as in the Israeli Doe case, courts decided against using the 
contractual framework to resolve reproductive disputes. While the 
analysis provided thus far highlighted the advantages and pitfalls of each 
framework, in the following sections I address directly some principal 
arguments for choosing one framework over the other. I then consider 
their applicability to Teuscher’s case and the context of sperm donation. 
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A.  In Favor of Contractual Enforcement 
In Kass v. Kass, the New York Court of Appeals held that 
cryopreservation agreements should be presumed valid and 
enforceable,204 and that in this particular instance, “the informed 
consents signed by the parties unequivocally manifest their mutual 
intention that in the present circumstances the pre-zygotes be donated for 
research to the IVF program.”205 After five years of marriage and three 
years of fertility treatments which resulted in five cryopreserved fertilized 
eggs, Maureen and Steven Kass divorced. Three weeks prior to their 
decision to dissolve the marriage, the couple signed four consent forms 
detailing the above-mentioned choice of disposition in case of 
disagreement.206 The court highlighted how these agreements “minimize 
misunderstandings and maximize procreative liberty by reserving to the 
progenitors the authority to make what is in the first instance a 
quintessentially personal, private decision. Written agreements also 
provide the certainty needed for effective operation of IVF programs.”207 
Professor John Robertson, one of the strongest proponents of the 
contractual approach, argues that such disposition agreements “should be 
enforced when they have been knowingly and intelligently made, and the 
parties have relied on them in undergoing IVF.”208 Robertson provides a 
number of reasons the parties’ reliance interest should be granted such 
strong protection. Among them is the proposition that pre-determined 
dispositional choices, guaranteed by agreements of this kind, may have 
been integral to a party’s decision to undertake IVF in the first place.209 
More specifically, the certainty provided by agreements in which they 
commit to a particular future disposition may be essential to their decision 
to engage with IVF.210 Moreover, since it is the parties’ reproductive 
freedom that is at stake, nonenforcement leads to the frustration of the 
“freedom they gain by entering into those agreements.”211 It also leads to 
the court’s judgment regarding intimate life decisions replacing that of 
the parties.212 
In the case of anonymous sperm donation, the contractual approach 
may lead courts to enforce donation agreements signed by donors in 
which they relinquished their rights in the sperm. This approach may also 
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lead courts to enforce agreements that grant sperm recipients full control 
over the sperm vials they had reserved for future use. Although these 
provisions lack the detail of those that command one particular course of 
action over another, they are nonetheless part of the parties’ reproductive 
choices. Enforcing such provisions protects their reliance interest and 
their reproductive freedom. This is especially true with regard to sperm 
recipients like Teuscher and Doe, who both imagined a reproductive 
future in which their children would carry and share a particular genetic 
constitution.213 Knowing in advance that they would not be able to use 
the same sperm donor may have affected their decision, and that of others 
in their position, to use this reproductive practice to conceive in the first 
place. 
Indeed, the Israeli Supreme Court was at least willing to recognize that 
Doe’s reliance interest had been violated, alongside “additional public 
considerations and interests (such as the lateral effects and the need to 
preserve the stability of the Sperm Bank).”214 It nonetheless found her 
reliance interest to be insufficient, noting that “the law . . . avoids 
coercion with respect to the intimate questions of human life in the 
absence of weighty considerations.”215 
There is, however, an argument to be made that employing the 
contractual framework in the context of sperm donation protects not only 
the interests of recipients, but also those of donors. The latter made a 
reproductive decision—a “waiver by contract of the right not to be a 
genetic parent.”216 As Professor Cohen explains in his analysis of this 
right, “allowing individuals to contractually waive their right not to be a 
genetic parent, notwithstanding that they may later regret that decision, 
is a necessary part of respecting them as persons.”217 In making this 
argument, Cohen, like Robertson, highlights the particular value 
individuals attach to procreative autonomy that makes freedom of 
contract “especially important” in this context.218 
In discussing the benefits of using the contractual approach for pre-
embryo disposition agreements, Cohen also considers the “actual 
reliance” interest that supports strong enforcement of dispositional 
agreements.219 His framing of the argument, however, focuses on the 
“harm to those who have actually relied on contracts promising access to 
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cryopreserved pre-embryos.”220 For women, “the relationship between 
age and fertility . . . may make successful healthy reproduction less likely, 
and more costly even if successful since more attempts at IVF will be 
needed.”221 This is in addition to the “discomfort, pain, and health risks” 
women incur in the process of harvesting eggs, and the emotional and 
financial investments IVF procedures entail.222 Sperm donation usually 
requires less medical intervention and a smaller financial investment, but, 
as earlier discussed, the emotional harms may be significant. Despite the 
difference between the harms imposed in each scenario, the recipients’ 
reliance interest—and the arguments in favor of enforcement that rest on 
it—may nonetheless be as strong in the context of sperm donation as in 
that of pre-embryo disputes. 
Proponents of contractual enforcement also point to the broader 
context of family contracting, where the enforceability of surrogacy, co-
parenting contracts, and premarital and postmarital agreements is now 
“well established.”223 These include gamete donation agreements, where 
donors waive both the “control over the gametes and his or her parental 
rights and obligations over any child conceived.”224 Indeed, being “the 
most well-established and least controversial method of assisted 
reproduction,”225 “neither current United States practice nor case law 
suggests that sperm donations of unlimited duration are or should be 
impermissible.”226  
B.  Against Contractual Enforcement 
Even those who support the application of a contractual approach, in 
principle, recognize that there are problems with these agreements, both 
in the process through which individuals enter them and in their 
content.227 Indeed, some courts were reluctant to enforce dispositional 
agreements, even when, like the Davis court, they considered them 
desirable vehicles for resolving these disputes.228 One principal difficulty 
is the fact that these agreements are found in consent forms provided by 
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several issues unrelated to dispositional choices, such as “medical risks 
and benefits of the procedure, storage limits and payment terms.”229 They 
often “us[e] highly technical language in densely packed, single-spaced 
documents, that may not even clearly delineate the different topics.”230 
Further, patients may sign these forms without even reading them.231 As 
the underlying facts of these cases suggest, at times only one of the parties 
actually read the form before signing it.232 
On the other hand, it is not clear that the same difficulties arise in the 
context of anonymous sperm donation. Unlike IVF and pre-embryo 
storage procedures, sperm donation consent forms govern a simpler 
interaction between the sperm bank, the donor, and the recipient. Both 
donating and purchasing sperm are rather simple processes that do not 
involve medical procedures, unlike those in the creation and storage of 
pre-embryos. This allows for shorter, more manageable forms, as 
illustrated in Doe, where the consent forms signed by both parties were 
no longer than three pages.233 Importantly, these forms govern only the 
relation between each party and the sperm bank. They do not govern or 
constitute a direct contractual relationship between the donor and 
recipient. Lastly, there is a difference in the “social context” of the two 
reproductive practices; as two scholars recently noted, “[f]rom a donor’s 
perspective, the donation of sperm or oocytes is usually a choice that they 
are able to make without any time pressure, with no urgent medical 
indication and, in the case of sperm donors, without undergoing an 
arduous and stressful medical procedure.”234 According to them, under 
circumstances where recipients “successfully used the donor gametes to 
have a child,” or even had simply “chosen a donor and made plans and 
assumptions about future treatment on this basis,” the donor should not 
be able to be withdraw consent.235 
Other critics challenge the contractual approach as a matter of 
principle. They find it inherently inappropriate to use contract law to 
decide reproductive disputes, given either the nature of the relationship it 
concerns or the parties’ interests that are at stake. Doe echoed these 
arguments, where the Israeli Court was reluctant to apply a contractual 
framework given the procreational interests at stake. Such an approach, 
it is argued, would insufficiently protect individual and societal 
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interests.236 According to this line of reasoning, certain areas of human 
activity involve rights that should be considered inalienable, “meaning 
that promises to relinquish these rights are not enforceable if the person 
who made the promise changes her mind.”237 Inalienable rights 
“generally relate to deeply personal decisions that are central to most 
people’s identity and sense of self.”238 These include decisions about 
marriage and having children as part of a relationship. As Professor Carl 
Coleman has argued in the context of pre-embryo disputes, “[m]aking the 
right to control these decisions inalienable ensures that, as a person’s 
identity changes over time, she will not be forced to live with the 
consequences of prior decisions that are no longer consistent with the 
values and preferences of the person she has become.”239 This argument 
raises again the question of harm, but focuses on that which will be 
imposed on donors rather than recipients, when the agreements they had 
signed with the sperm bank are enforced. 
Some justify the conclusion that the right not be a parent—in this case 
a genetic parent—is inalienable because of the emotional nature of 
reproductive decisions such as the decision to become a surrogate mother. 
This characteristic of reproductive decisions, alongside the difficulty of 
predicting one’s response to life-altering experiences such as parenthood 
or infertility, may lead to the conclusion that it is “impossible to make a 
knowing and intelligent decision to relinquish a right in advance of the 
time the right is to be exercised.”240 Moreover, both Coleman241 and the 
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Doe court similarly ground their objection to the contractual approach in 
societal values and “conceptions about the nature of family relationships 
and the strength of genetic ties,”242 as well as in concerns about the 
commodification of children and reproduction.243 
Yet this type of public policy concern should not necessarily lead to 
rejecting the contractual approach all at once. As Professor Cohen argues 
in response to Coleman, some individuals may end up regretting their 
contractual choices about genetic parenthood.244 This is true even if 
service providers such as sperm banks or fertility clinic take steps to 
better the conditions under which people consent to undergo IVF 
treatments or donate gametes.245 In this sense, the context of reproduction 
is not different than other areas of life where contracts are held valid even 
though errors people have made in entering them may have significant 
consequences for their personal welfare.246 Furthermore, classifying 
reproductive rights as inalienable ignores the fact that “some individuals 
are unbothered by the notion that they may have genetic children in 
existence with whom they have no relationship, expressing a reluctance 
to view them as anything other than ‘other people’s children.’”247 
Importantly, such arguments against contractual enforcement have 
limited bearing in the context of anonymous sperm donation. Agreements 
governing the use of sperm donations do not concern “intrafamilial” 
promises. Unlike couples undergoing fertility treatments, the relationship 
between donors and recipients is not a familial one. The social context in 
which they make the decision to become a sperm donor or recipient is 
different from the intimate setting in which infertile couples decide to 
undergo IVF treatments and may deserve to be treated more like a 
business transaction. 
Undoubtedly, assisted reproductive technologies have become a 
lucrative industry provided through what many describe as a market for 
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reproductive services.248 This reality has been the subject of extensive 
criticism over the development of such market and the desired role the 
law should play in regulating it.249 At the same time, and as law Professor 
Martha Ertman argues with regard to gamete markets, “market 
mechanisms provide unique opportunities for law and culture to 
recognize that people form families in different ways.”250 The 
mechanisms of supply and demand operate to subvert a majoritarian 
morality that may otherwise prevent single women like Danielle and Doe 
from forming families that break from the traditional model.251 Rejecting 
the contractual approach because it undermines certain societal 
conceptions regarding the “strength of genetic ties” can itself be 
understood as an expression of majoritarian bias toward the genetic 
model of parenthood.252 The genetic model is based in traditional 
conservative notions of family and fails to recognize alternative modes 
of parenting that are not necessarily based on biological parenthood. In 
this sense, contracts facilitate the variety of kinship models through 
which singles or couples, married or unmarried, and people of the same 
or different sexes, can become parents and start a family.253 With such 
contracts, “[i]nstead of talking about ‘the’ family as one kind of 
relationship honored above all others by Nature or God—marriage, 
heterosexuality, genetic kinship,” we can “let people decide for 
themselves when, whether, how and with whom to form their most 
intimate relationships.”254 
C.  Application: Anonymous Sperm Donation Agreements 
For reasons discussed thus far, I argue that in the context of anonymous 
sperm donation, the contractual approach is a more appropriate legal 
prism through which disputes should be resolved. In Teuscher’s case, this 
means turning to the separate agreements signed by the donor and 
Danielle with the sperm bank to decide whether Danielle should regain 
access to her reserved sperm vials. 
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Starting with the donor, a court may look for provisions that explicitly 
deny donors the possibility to revoke their consent to use of their sperm. 
As noted earlier, in most cases sperm donors relinquish their rights 
without time limits and are not offered the opportunity to revoke consent 
to use of the sperm at a later date. But even assuming such a provision is 
found in the agreement, a court might find it difficult to enforce it if the 
agreement does not contemplate the possibility of the donor losing his 
anonymity, if anonymity has been guaranteed. 
Similar difficulties may arise with regard to the agreement Danielle, as 
a recipient, signed with the bank. Ideally, such an agreement includes 
provisions that detail under which circumstances the bank can deny her 
access to sperm vials she had reserved. For example, it may include a 
provision providing that violating the contract she had signed with the 
bank by seeking the identity of the donor may result in losing her rights 
in the reserved vials. Some direction can also be found in provisions that 
consider the possibility of the donor having a change of heart. 
If both agreements are silent about the circumstances presented in 
Teuscher’s case, a court may resort to the balancing approach for 
resolution. In the pre-embryo disposition agreements context for 
example, despite most courts’ preference for a contract-based approach, 
in many instances courts have had to employ the balancing test when an 
existing agreement was silent with regard to all or certain contingencies, 
or when the agreement left it to the court to decide.255 
The question of remedies also arises when courts choose the 
contractual approach. In considering this question I set aside Danielle’s 
breach of the contract and the consequences which may flow from it. 
Assuming that the contracts signed by both parties provide that Danielle 
could use the additional vials, what will a court do if the donor or the 
sperm bank insist on denying her access to these vials? Will the court 
order to release the vials to Danielle or will it be limited to awarding 
damages? 
In the context of pre-embryos disputes, one scholar noted that “[t]he 
very factor that might lead us instinctively to reject the option of specific 
performance—that the embryos are unique to both parties—in fact 
provides the basis for it.”256 While specific performance is typically 
available when damages are not an adequate remedy, given the unique 
subject matter, courts would generally refuse to award this remedy 
because of concerns over judicial supervision and other practical 
difficulties. According to Cohen, however, “[c]ontracts relating to frozen 
pre-embryos seem like the paradigmatic case where specific performance 
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is appropriate.”257 Contracts that compel genetic parenthood, he explains, 
do not require judicial supervision: “the pre-embryo which has been 
cryopreserved is already in the custody of the clinic and the party now 
objecting to the contractual arrangement need not do anything for the 
contract to be enforced.”258 
For contracts relating to anonymous sperm donation, such arguments 
against awarding specific performance seem to apply even less. Not only 
that the donor is not required to take any steps, but the context of sperm 
donation also operates to eliminate concerns over forcing familial 
relationships or legal parenthood and the supervision difficulties that 
these in turn give rise to. But the fact that only one party is the genetic 
progenitor of the disputed gametes may make a monetary award an 
adequate compensation for Danielle, who could use the money to 
purchase other sperm vials. Yet that Danielle already brought one child 
to the world using the sperm vials may carry the same weight as embryos 
created with both parties’ gametes. In any case, this brief discussion 
shows why courts are better off deciding the appropriateness of the 
remedy on a case by case basis, instead of opting for a “damages-only 
regime.”259 
D.  Drafting Recommendations 
Applying the contractual framework to the case at-hand illustrates how 
choosing this approach will only prove fruitful when agreements for 
anonymously donating and purchasing sperm anticipate a variety of 
circumstances and possibilities that these relationships may entail. 
One way to increase the chances of enforcement is for reproductive 
service providers to draft better contracts. Sperm donor agreements 
should include detailed provisions that contemplate the possibility of 
removed anonymity and its consequences for both donors and recipients. 
These provisions should account for different scenarios under which 
anonymity may be lost, including if the identity of the donor was 
discovered intentionally or accidently. Another scenario to consider is 
one where the child born through sperm donation seeks the identity of the 
donor, rather than the sperm recipient. 
The possibility of donors revoking their consent to any further use of 
their sperm vials should also be explicitly regarded. Losing anonymity is 
one reason for the donor to have a change of heart. Yet the Doe case 
demonstrates that there are other weighty reasons, such as embracing new 
religious beliefs, worth considering here. The point is that blanket 
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provisions in which donors relinquish their rights in their sperm may be 
harder to enforce under certain sets of relatively novel circumstances, 
such as those found in Teuscher’s case. 
Clearly, the task of predicting the various issues removed anonymity 
may give rise to in the context of sperm donation is not an easy one. Yet 
another way to simplify agreements that regulate sperm donation is 
perhaps to relinquish anonymity all at once. The Teuscher case well 
illustrates the difficulty of maintaining donor anonymity these days, 
considering the ease with which one can find his or her genetic progeny. 
The donor sibling registry—a website connecting donor-conceived 
children with one another as well as with gamete donors that now has 
over sixty thousand members—is one example of the elusive nature of 
donor anonymity nowadays. The donor movement, led by donor 
offspring advocating for more disclosure within the gamete industry and 
a “child’s right to know,” make this task even harder.260 One scholar even 
described the ability of sperm banks and egg agencies to promise 
anonymity in this age as “fraudulent.”261 
Responding to these changes, a growing number of countries have 
reversed their long-held policies protecting gamete donors’ anonymity, 
by collecting donors’ identifying information and requiring their consent 
to be contacted in the future by any resulting offspring.262 The US did 
not join this trend as of yet, although some think the field of sperm 
donation “is on the verge of a major transition.”263 
The question of donor anonymity and the reasons why different 
stakeholders in this practice, including donors, recipients, and children, 
may want to maintain or abolish it are beyond the scope of this article. 
The point here is that at-home DNA kits, as well as online registries, may 
soon turn the question of whether donor anonymity is desirable, into 
whether donor anonymity is feasible. 
CONCLUSION 
Reproductive disputes are infamously known for being emotionally 
charged and difficult to resolve. At the same time, technological 
developments give rise to new types of legal disputes surrounding the use 
of even well-established reproductive practices such as sperm donation. 
The Teuscher case discussed throughout this article provides a valuable 
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opportunity to contemplate the legal tools available for those deciding a 
dispute between sperm recipients’ interest in having a child with the 
sperm they chose, and sperm donors’ interest in avoiding genetic 
parenthood. 
Analyzing this case against the backdrop of pre-embryo disposition 
disputes shows that the context of sperm donation necessitates careful 
consideration of the rights at stake. One that recognizes that there are 
different models of parenthood besides genetic parenthood. Realizing the 
unique characteristics of this type of dispute allows us to question the 
harm unwanted genetic procreation may actually impose, and to consider 
new types of harm that confounded procreation may entail. The nuanced 
analysis provided in this article demonstrates that the contractual 
approach is the more appropriate legal prism to adjudicate such 
reproductive disputes, considering the non-familial context in which they 
occur. It nevertheless acknowledges that this approach has its 
shortcomings, proposing that reproductive services providers draft 
contracts that are better equipped to govern their long-term relationship 
with donors and recipients. 
As more people begin to learn, intentionally or not, about their genetic 
origins, the more the fertility market’s long-held dedication to donor 
anonymity is undermined. This article intends to ease the task of 
resolving conflicts between these individuals’ reproductive futures. 
